| Week | Topics | Study Materials | Materials |
| 1 |
Week 1: Introduction to Political Economics
• Overview of the course and key questions
• What is political economics?
• Rational choice and methodological individualism
• Reading: Introductory chapter from a Political Economics textbook (e.g., Persson & Tabellini)
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| 2 |
Week 2: Rational Choice Theory and the Role of Institutions
• Utility maximization in political contexts
• Institutions as rules of the game
• Endogenous vs. exogenous institutions
• Reading: North (1990) – Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (selections)
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| 3 |
Week 3: The Median Voter Theorem
• Assumptions and implications
• Spatial voting models
• Applications to democratic decision-making
• Reading: Downs (1957) – An Economic Theory of Democracy (selections)
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| 4 |
Week 4: Political Behavior of Voters
• Voter turnout and rational abstention
• Information asymmetries and irrationality
• Identity, preferences, and heuristics
• Reading: Mueller (2003), Public Choice III (selected sections)
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| 5 |
Week 5: Politicians and Electoral Competition
• Vote-maximizing behavior
• Opportunistic and partisan political cycles
• Accountability and term limits
• Reading: Rogoff (1990), “Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles”
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| 6 |
Week 6: Bureaucrats and the State
• Bureaucratic behavior as utility-maximizing
• Niskanen model of bureaucracy
• Bureaucracy vs. technocracy
• Reading: Niskanen (1971), Bureaucracy and Representative Government (selections)
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| 7 |
Week 7: Interest Groups and Lobbying
• Olson’s Logic of Collective Action
• Theories of lobbying and influence
• Interest group competition and regulation
• Reading: Olson (1965), Logic of Collective Action
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| 8 |
Week 8: Rent-Seeking and Corruption
• Tullock’s rent-seeking model
• State capture and regulatory capture
• Institutional responses to rent-seeking
• Reading: Krueger (1974), “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society”
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| 9 |
Week 9: Institutions and Economic Performance
• How political institutions affect economic outcomes
• Empirical approaches to causality
• Institutional persistence and change
• Reading: Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2001), “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development”
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| 10 |
Week 10: Public Goods and Collective Decision-Making
• Public good provision and free-rider problems
• Mechanisms for collective choice
• Voting rules and outcomes
• Reading: Ostrom (1990), Governing the Commons (selections)
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| 11 |
Week 11: Agricultural and Environmental Policy
• Subsidies and interest group politics
• Resource management and environmental lobbying
• Political constraints on sustainability
• Case studies: CAP (EU), US Farm Bill
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| 12 |
Week 12: Trade Policy and Protectionism
• Political economy of trade
• Distributional consequences of openness
• Lobbying and trade barriers
• Reading: Grossman & Helpman (1994), “Protection for Sale”
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| 13 |
Week 13: Political Business Cycles and Macroeconomic Policy
• How political incentives shape fiscal and monetary decisions
• Time inconsistency and institutional solutions
• Central bank independence
• Reading: Alesina & Roubini (1997), Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy (selections)
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| 14 |
Week 14: Review and Student Presentations / Policy Applications
• Student presentations or debates on selected policy topics
• Integration of theoretical and applied material
• Final review and Q&A
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